This morning I was telling my girlfriend about some of my experiences working as a system safety engineer on the Trident Missile System. After finishing my degree in engineering, I took a new job as a system safety engineer at Lockheed Missiles and Space company in the early 1980’s. Lockheed’s job offer was the first time I had ever heard of a system safety engineer, or a safety engineer of any kind for that matter. I found myself transitioning from a small time general contractor in coastal Northern California to suddenly being involved in a huge, high-tech project involving the worlds biggest and most deadly weapon system! I was thrown from the kumbaya laid back liberal living in the back waters of California to the center of a massive new weapon system capable of destroying civilization as we know it! My rationale that allowed me to make such a transition was (and still is) that these things are so damned dangerous we better make sure they don’t accidentally cause mischief – either in the sense of a nuclear bomb, or more simply as in the form of non-nuclear accidents involved with their storage, transportation, maintenance, inspection, etc.

The discussion with my girlfriend eventually progressed to a discussion of what a “ballistic” missile with on-board guidance capability is. The important aspect of this is that a ballistic missile is guided only when it’s first launched. After that its flight is subject to the law of gravity. The design of these systems result in them being uncontrolled from outside sources once launched. They can’t be aborted, turned back, or redirected – basically they are “point and shoot” devices (it is actually a lot more complicated than that, but the outcome is the same). The idea is that you wouldn’t want the enemy to be able to highjack the system and neutralize your missiles – therefore outside control is not an option. Once they are launched, they will do what they have been programmed to do.

It is difficult to conceive of the size of our nuclear arsenal. It is truly horrific just considering the capability of the D5 (Trident II) nuclear fleet consisting of 14 submarines carrying up to 24 missiles each (currently limited to 20 by treaty). Each missile can deliver around 8 warheads. At the present time, the missiles are armed with “low yield” war heads comparable to those used on Nagasaki and Hiroshima. However, those can be replace with warheads that are more than 30 times that powerful – each warhead.

That brings up the question of what prevents them from being launched at the wrong time? Not much. A single person (the President) has the authority to order a launch at any time. They can implement this command through a device that is humorously referred to as the “nuclear football.” The entire command and control system has been designed to allow an essentially unfettered access to this awesome power by the President. As far as I know, there are no official “checks and balances” to this authority. The reason for this is that the command must be implemented very quickly if it is to be carried out before the threat of incoming nuclear warheads from a hostile enemy destroy our ability to respond. Time is of the essence, and there is just barely enough time to set targets, arm, and launch our retaliatory missiles should we be attacked. This is the essence of our doctrine of “mutual assured destruction” (MAD).

Quoting from Wikipedia, “Mutual assured destruction (MAD) is a doctrine of military strategy and national security policy which posits that a full-scale use of nuclear weapons by an attacker on a nuclear-armed defender with second-strike capabilities would result in the complete annihilation of both the attacker and the defender.” Since it is practically impossible to survive a massive first-strike, the strategy is to launch the “second-strike” before the first strike has occurred.

It turns out that it isn’t quite as hard-and-fast as that sounds. There has been at least one instance where a launch from Russia was detected by our early warning system. Doctrine indicated that our missiles were supposed to be launched within approximately five minutes from detection. No checks and balances were in place, and everyone in the chain of command was mandated to carry out a retaliatory launch. However, the command was not launched in violation of the “rules” – the President at the time decided to wait and see because there was no build-up to the immediate threat of an attack. As you know (because you are still alive) that “launch” was a false alarm, it was a glitch in the early warning system. We dodged a bullet because those in command were willing to violate their orders. Lucky us. There have been other “close calls,” but since they have not been published in the open press they remain shadowy “rumors.” The point is that our survival depended upon having quick thinking, dedicated, highly trained, stable individuals in place at that moment who were willing and capable of making the “right” decision.

That brings me to the consideration of our current Presidential election. Who will be in charge of the nuclear football when the election is over? The question goes far beyond the stability and knowledge of the President at the moment of decision, but more critically – who is in place to support a quick and rationale decision? Since there are no effective means for implementing organizational controls, regulations, overviews or “checks and balances” – those checks and balances will depend upon those who are personally surrounding the President at the moment of decision. That is why it is so important to make sure that all of the President’s assistants are qualified for their jobs. This means the cabinet members, and the heads of the various departments (such as the Department of Justice, the Department of Defense, etc). He needs the best and brightest at his side should such a decision need to be made again – or should the President decide to make such a decision on his own rather than in response to an active threat. The person in control of the Nuclear Football actually and truly has control of our nuclear weapon system – and the future of civilization. The President’s selection of close advisors can be expected to play a crucial part in assuring the stability, and safety, of our nuclear arsenal should the topic turn from “theoretical” to “real.”

Note: Just in case I might not have been clear, Trump represents the danger that I am talking about given his penchant for “shooting from the hip” without any apparent consideration of the consequences of his actions, his profound lack of understanding of much of anything, and his habit of surrounding himself with incompetent, inexperienced “yes men.” He intentionally isolates himself from those who might question or disagree with him – including his selections for the Supreme Court.